Again, who are you supporting?
When Dallis and Marla Tirey divorced in 1994, they had two children living with them. Their child and Marla’s brother’s child, over whom they has assumed custody. In the divorce, Dallis agreed to pay support for both kids. Much later, Dallis filed to modify the support order to drop support for the child that was not his, claiming that the child’s father had the responsibility to support the child, not him. The court of appeals said “no:”
This case, on the other hand, involves a valid agreement between the parties establishing what might be described as gratuitous child support. We are persuaded that in such circumstances, the rules of contracts come into play in a way that is not the case with respect to court-imposed support. In this situation, we are guided not only by the relevant statutory guidelines, but also by contract principles. When parties enter into a valid agreement with adequate consideration, the terms of the agreement are mutually and permanently binding on the parties if the court approves the agreement. This principle applies with respect to child support obligations in a dissolution action. Moreover, the court can include in its support order an obligation that the obligated party voluntarily agreed to, but that the court would not have had authority to impose in the first place without such agreement. (Citations omitted)
This is a cautionary tale in many respects. The basic lesson is that if you agree to do something in a divorce that the court could not order you to do, you will likely find the court unwilling to step in later and relieve you of this burden. This includes paying for extra children, as in the case above, but also in paying more than what the law requires in child support. Also, although not at issue in this case, the time to determine the paternity of children born in the marriage is at the divorce. After the child is deemed to be “a child of the marriage” in the divorce, a later challenge to the child’s paternity is likely to fail.
