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Although Reed argues that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the limitation of consecutive sentences found in Ind. Code 35-50-1-2(c), we agree with the post-conviction court that Reed’s sentencing did not violate
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we conclude that East Chicago is not entitled to law enforcement immunity under the ITCA under the circumstances of this case where it was alleged that the East Chicago police officers violated their statutory duty to drive with due regard for the safety
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones a surrebuttal closing argument.
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Although Everage argues that such a harsh sanction (witness exclusion) was needed due to its surprise and NIPSCO’s sandbagging, we find Everage’s claims of surprise and sandbagging to be unpersuasive
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It is not clear from our supreme court’s decision what standard of review it used when reviewing whether the defendant’s probation revocation sentence was unreasonable.
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Concluding that the trial court improperly exercised its jurisdiction over Joseph with respect to the payment of child support, we reverse the judgment and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it dismiss Terry’s request for support
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A judgment of acquittal is especial in the jurisprudence of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Even where an acquittal is based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation, a defendant may not be retried for the same offense
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We therefore cannot accept HCF’s invitation to interfere in the NCAA’s internal affairs.
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This pattern of criminal activity removes this case from Blakely’s purview.
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We find that Arthur’s convictions for fleeing in a vehicle and fleeing on foot cannot both stand because they violate double jeopardy principles
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