Case Links from the Indiana Supreme Court for June 22, 2005
Mr. Wright was convicted of 2 counts of neglect of a dependent and 4 battery counts, all as class B felonies for the severe abuse of young children over “a substantial period of time.” The Court clearly did not like having to reverse Mr. Wright’s sentence, but Blakely required it: “Grievous and obvious as the remaining aggravating circumstances in this case are, they do not fit under any of the categories identified in Blakely and noted in Smylie and cannot support the imposition of the enhanced sentences.”
Mr. Wright received 15 year sentences on each B felony, with three of the charges ordered to be served consecutively, for a total of 45 years. As the Supreme Court noted, the current reading of Blakely by the court permits the trial judge to order sentences served consecutively based on aggravating factors not found by a jury, so Mr. Wright’s resentencing will likely go in his favor. Even if the trial court reduced the sentences imposed to the 10 year presumptive sentence (3 x 10 = 30) the Supreme Court all but invited the trial court to make additional presumptive sentences consecutive (10 x 6 = 60): “The State may elect to prove aggravating circumstances to a jury or it may accept standard terms on each count and ask the trial court to reassess how many and which punishments should be served consecutively.”
A big slap down of the Court of Appeals finding no arguable basis for the Court of Appeals determination that Indiana courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review disciplinary actions taken against inmates by the Indiana Department of Correction:
We are able to sidestep these types of questions here. While an argument can be made that the duties imposed on the DOC in these prison discipline statutes are for the public’s benefit, the stronger argument seems to us to be that these duties are imposed for the benefit of the in-mates, and, in any event, we assume they are. But even if that be so, the question here is ulti-mately one of legislative intent, and we find that the Legislature does not intend that inmates have a private right of action to enforce these statutes.
Basically the court agreed that the DOC has certain obligations under the code with respect to inmate discipline, but holds that there is no remedy in the courts for the inmates if the DOC chooses to violate those duties.
