Case Links for June 23, 2004
Poor Mr. Yang. By all accounts, he was driving along when Ms. Smith crossed the double yellow line on a curve and hit Yang head on. Then she sued HIM for negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in Yang’s favor, though, deciding that the “faked left syndrome” propounded by Smith’s expert did not support the case as no one saw Yang’s vehicle cross the line.
Indiana’s constitution contained a prohibition against incarceration because of a debt. (Articl1, Section 22). Generally, this prohibition has been read by the courts as barring the use of incarceration to force payment of money owed. However, there is an exception carved out for child support, and courts have determined that it is appropriate to incarcerate people who fail to pay their support for violating the support order.In recent years, this exception has received increased attention from the courts (as support collection continues to become a major issue), and the courts have clarified that the role of incarceration in a child support case is not to punish the violation, but to coerce payment. Mr. Branum’s case comes up on rehearing to confirm this principal, and the Court of Appeals clarifies that the trial court must make a determination that Mr. Branum has the financial ability to pay the support before holding him in contempt for failing to do so.
This case stresses a fine point in child support cases that is often missed by trial courts and support enforcers: IN a criminal non-support case, the State has to prove that, in the past, the parent had the obligation to pay support and had the financial ability to do so, and failed to pay. In a civil contempt case, the trial court needs to find that the past failure occurred, as in a criminal case, but it also must determine that the parent has the present ability to pay (”has the financial ability to comply”).
Jacobs and Hilliard go into business together, and, under a written agreement, maintain term life insurance policies on each other to be used to buy each other out of the business on death. This is a fairly standard arrangement, but the agreement did not specify what was to happen if they sold the business, which they did. Jacobs maintained his policy on Hilliard after the sale and Hilliard sued to make him stop. The trial court granted Hilliard the relief he sought, and the Court of Appeals reversed, noting that nothing in the parties written agreements prevents Jacobs from continuing his life insurance on Hilliard after the sale of the business.
The Indiana Supreme Court reweighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, finding that the trial court relied on some invalid aggravating circumstances and failed to find certain mitigating circumstances resulting in a reduction of Mr. Cotto’s sentence to 30 years, down from 50.
Defendant entered into an “illegal” plea agreement, requiring her to serve a sentence consecutive to another sentence she had been given in a different case. She took the plea to the second murder case because the state agreed to drop the death penalty in exchange. The Supreme Court agreed that the sentence was illegal, but held that a defendant cannot enter an illegal plea, receive the benefits of that plea, and then seek to challenge the sentence she received under the illegal plea.
Mr. Lacey had the right to discovery in his petition for post-conviction relief, and this right means that the trial court should not have denied him access to the evidence used in the underlying offense to conduct DNA testing. Indiana Supreme Court.
Tenant in a shopping center operated a Kroger grocery store. A provision in the lease prohibited the landlord from leasing to another grocery store (anti-competition). Later, the tenant assigned its rights under the lease to another grocery store business who in turn sub-lets its space in the shopping center to H.H. Gregg. There is no longer a grocery store in the shopping center, and the Landlord attempted to bring one in. Tenant filed suit to enforce the anti-competition provision of the lease. The Indiana Supreme Court upholds, generally speaking, the validity of these types of anti-competition provisions, but finds that here, where the tenant has sublet its interest and no longer operates a business in the Shopping Center itself that would be harmed if a competitor was brought in, the restrictive provision of the lease had become too burdensome on the landlord and is not enforceable.
US Supreme Court decision requiring appointed counsel on appeals after a plea of guilty, i.e. Appeal of the sentencing alone.
In a 5 to 4 decision, the US Supreme Court determines that the government can take private property under eminent domain and turn it over to a private developer to profit from, so long as the government’s intentions in taking the property are to serve some public policy. Here the public policy was revitalizing a segment of the town of New London, Connecticut, which had been deemed to be economically distresses. The goal was to free up land for development to increase property values and benefit the local economy all with an eye towards increasing local tax revenues.
This decision, while not a surprise (as the Court points out, these types of taking have been going on for a long time, think railroads), will likely embolden local municipal planners, and strike fear in the hearts of property owners. Somehow, many Americans walk around with the concept that you can buy land and, as long as what you do is legal, do with it as you see fit. This decision says that if the government does not think your intentions for the land meet its needs, it can force you to give it up. So much for the “ownership society.”
Thus, if predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one privateparty to another constitutional, then the words “for public use” do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus donot exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting
