Case links for June 28, 2005
The 1962 Crume trust is a 3 million dollar-plus “public benefit trust” with the Humane Society of Indianapolis as the sole trustee. The trustee wanted to pledge the trust assets as collateral on a loan for its own benefit, and petitioned a probate court for authority to do so. The appellants, other groups involved in the care of animals in Marion County, entered the case and filed objections. Under the stated purposes of the trust, these groups would be potential beneficiaries of the trust, if the trustee were to fail, so argued they had standing in the probate proceedings to file the objection as they have a vested interest in the purposes of the trust. The trustee, supported by Steve Carter, Indiana Attorney general objected, and the trial court found no standing for the challengers. The Court of Appeals affirms, finding that the Attorney General is the sole party with standing to challenge the actions of a trustee in this public benefits trust.
The Court of Appeals interpreted the statute controlling the administration of 1937 Firefighter’s Pension Fund, and determines that the local pension board does not have to conduct a hearing before transferring a disabled fire fighter who is over age 55 from disability to retirement.
This one has to make you wonder. Mr. Smith plead guilty to a B Felony methanphedamine charge under an agreement for the court to impose a 20 year sentence, but leaving the trial court free to determine how much of the sentence should be suspended. The trial court suspended no time, leaving Mr. Smith to serve the maximum time on a B Felony. Mr. Smith appealed the sentence on several grounds, including several Blakely related issues. The Court of Appeals determine that since the parties agreed to a maximum term, the trial court was not obligated to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether to suspend any time, so no Blakely violations.
In the Matter of R.J.; Roderick Johnson v. Lake County Office of Family & Children
The Court of Appeals issues a very rare reversal of a termination of parental rights, finding that the Office of Family and Children (OFC) did not carry its burden of proof. Although the statutory provisions regarding termination of parental rights are complicated and fairly technical, this decision does not turn on any fine interpretation of the statutes, so the case is not likely to be too useful to the practitioner. Instead, the decision turns on the fact that the trial court’s findings are not supported by evidence in the record, including a finding of mental instability and homicidal threats that did not appear in the record. The OFC basically argued that Mr. Johnson did not make enough efforts to put himself in a position to be able to parent the child, pointing out that the case was pending with the CFC for years. TheCourt of Appeals rejects this contention, noting that Mr. Johnson completed all the services offered to him, secured a home and a full time job, and maintained visitation with the child during the case.
The Court also pointed out that, just because the child would be “better off” with the proposed adoptive parents, and that it might be in the child’s best interest to terminate the father’s rights so he could be adopted does not mean that the OFC has met its burden of proof. I say that a reversal is rare as the appeals courts seldom want to second guess the trial court in these cases. The child was removed from the parent 5 years ago, and likely, the termination decision came out almost a year ago. By reversing the termination at this stage, this child is going to be left with a big adjustment to make.
Warrant issued based on a reported anonymous tip to a crime stoppers line. The tip contained easily discoverable facts about Mr. Mason (where he lived, his approximate age, and the type of car he drove), and some serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing. The tipster did not disclose how he or she came to know about the illegal conduct going on at Mr. Mason’s house (prostitution, sex with minors, drugs, etc). The police were able to confirm the details of the readibly discoverable items, and even saw him leave his house with a young woman, get in his truck and later drop him off, but nothing else. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding the warrant not supported by probable cause, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that where the credibility of the informant is unknown, and the police cannot confirm any details of the account, save for legal and easily discoverable facts, there is not enough reliability in the tip to issue a warrant. The Court also rejected the “good faith” argument of the state, focusing on the crafty way the detective put the affidavit for the search warrant together in concluding that the officers could not claim to have relied on the validity of the warrant. Finally, the Court of appeals chastises the officers for failing to file the affidavit until 28 days after the warrant was issued, in violation of the statute requiring filing before the warrant is executed.
Donna J. MacLafferty v. William P. MacLafferty
This is simply a great case. The Supreme Court of Indiana takes up the issue of when can a parent obtain a modification of the child support obligation. The statute has 2 tests: either a substantial and continuing change of circumstances making the existing order unreasonable, or the support would change by at least 20% and the order is over 1 year old. Mr. MacLafferty’s order was less than 1 year old, and his support obligation changed only by 14%, so he had to argue under the significant change in circumstances.
The Court does not say that a less than 14% change in support obligation cannot constitute a significant change in circumstances, but it definitely clarifies that when the legislature put the 20% test in the statute, the intention was to limit modifications based solely on changes in incomes over time to the 20% test. To interpret the statute to permit a modification for Mr. MacLafferty with only a 14% change in support would make the percentage test in the statute a nullity. Since the percentage test has been pretty much a nullity in practice, this case should clarify the application of this statute significantly.
Indiana Code 32-24-1-13 exempts the state Transportation Department from having to make an offer to buy property from the owner before seeking to condemn it under eminent domain. So says the Supreme Court.
